Attention and Conscious Perception in the Hypothesis Testing Brain by Jakob Hohwy
HYPOTHESIS ANDTHEORY ARTICLE
published: 02 April 2012
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00096
Attention and conscious perception in the hypothesis
testing brain
Jakob Hohwy*
Department of Philosophy, Monash University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia
Edited by:
NaotsuguTsuchiya, Monash
University, Australia
Reviewed by:
Andy Clark, University of Edinburgh,
UK
Floris P. De Lange, Radboud
University Nijmegen, Netherlands
*Correspondence:
Jakob Hohwy, Department of
Philosophy, Monash University,
Clayton, VIC 3800, Australia.
e-mail: jakob.hohwy@monash.edu
Conscious perception and attention are difﬁcult to study, partly because their relation to
each other is not fully understood. Rather than conceiving and studying them in isolation
from each other it may be useful to locate them in an independently motivated, general
framework, from which a principled account of how they relate can then emerge. Accord-
ingly, these mental phenomena are here reviewed through the prism of the increasingly
inﬂuential predictive coding framework. On this framework, conscious perception can be
seen as the upshot of prediction error minimization and attention as the optimization of
precision expectations during such perceptual inference. This approach maps on well to a
range of standard characteristics of conscious perception and attention, and can be used
to interpret a range of empirical ﬁndings on their relation to each other.
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INTRODUCTION
The nature of attention is still unresolved, the nature of conscious
perception is still a mystery – and their relation to each other is
not clearly understood. Here, the relation between attention and
conscious perception is reviewed through the prism of predictive
coding. This is the idea that the brain is essentially a sophisti-
cated hypothesis tester (Helmholtz, 1860; Gregory, 1980), which
continually and at multiple spatiotemporal scales seeks to min-
imize the error between its predictions of sensory input and the
actual incoming input (seeMumford, 1992; Friston, 2010). On this
framework, attention and perception are two distinct, yet related
aspects of the same fundamental prediction error minimization
mechanism. The upshot of the review here is that together they
determine which contents are selected for conscious presentation
and which are not. This uniﬁes a number of experimental ﬁndings
and philosophical issues on attention and conscious perception,
and puts them in a different light. The prediction error minimiza-
tion framework transpires as an attractive, if yet still speculative,
approach to attention and consciousness, and their relation to
each other.
Attention is difﬁcult to study because it is multifaceted and
intertwined with conscious perception. Thus, attention can be
endogenous (more indirect, top-down, or motivationally driven)
or exogenous (bottom-up, attention grabbing); it can be focal or
global; it can be directed at objects, properties, or spatial or tempo-
ral regions, and so on (Watzl, 2011a,b). Attentional change often
seems accompanied by a change in conscious perception such that
what grabs attention is a new stimulus, and such that whatever is
attended to also populates consciousness. It can therefore be difﬁ-
cult to ascertainwhether an experimentalmanipulation intervenes
cleanly on attention or whether it intervenes on consciousness too
(Van Boxtel et al., 2010).
Consciousness is difﬁcult to study, partly because of the inter-
twinement with attention and partly because it is multifaceted
too. Consciousness can apply to an overall state (e.g., awake vs.
dreamless sleep) or a particular representation (e.g., conscious vs.
unconscious processing of a face) all somehow tied together in
the unity of the conscious stream (Bayne, 2010); it can pertain
to the notion of a self (self-awareness) or just to being conscious
(experience), and so on (Hohwy and Fox, 2012)1. There are widely
accepted tools for identifying the neural correlates of conscious
experience, though there is also some controversy about how
cleanly they manipulate conscious states rather than a wide range
of other cognitive processes (Hohwy, 2009). In the background
is the perennial, metaphysical mind–body problem (Chalmers,
1996), which casts doubt on the possibility of ever achieving a
fundamentally naturalist understanding of consciousness; (wewill
not discuss any metaphysics in this paper, however).
Functionally, attention is sometimes said to be an “analyzer,”
dissecting and selecting among the many possible and often com-
peting percepts one has at any given time. Consciousness in con-
trast seems to be a “synthesizer,” bringing together and organizing
our multitudinous sensory input at any given time (Van Boxtel
et al., 2010). On the other hand, attention may bring unity too, via
binding (Treisman and Gelade, 1980), and consciousness also has
a selective role when ambiguities in the sensory input are resolved
in favor of one rather than the other interpretation, as seems to
happen in binocular rivalry.
Attention and consciousness, then, are both difﬁcult to deﬁne,
to operationalize in functional terms, and to manipulate experi-
mentally. Part of the trouble here has to do with the phenomena
themselves, and possibly even their metaphysical underpinnings.
But a large part of the trouble seems due to their intertwined
relations. It is difﬁcult to resolve these issues by appeal to
1In addition to perceptual forms of consciousness there is also a live debate, set aside
here, about non-perceptual forms of consciousness, such as conceptual thought
(Bayne and Montague, 2011).
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commonsense or empirically informed conceptual analyses of
each phenomenon in isolation of the other. For this reason it may
be fruitful to appeal to a very general theoretical framework for
overall brain function, such as the increasingly inﬂuential predic-
tion error minimization approach, and review whether it implies
coherently related phenomena with a reasonable ﬁt to attention
and conscious perception.
Section “Aspects of Prediction Error Minimization” describes
heuristically the prediction error minimization approach. Section
“Prediction Error and Precision” focuses on two aspects of this
approach, here labeled accuracy and precision, and maps these
onto perceptual inference and attention. Section “Conscious Per-
ception and Attention as Determined by Precise Prediction Error
Minimization” outlines why this mapping might be useful for
understanding conscious perception and its relation to atten-
tion. In Section “Interpreting Empirical Findings in the Light of
Attention as Precision Optimization,” the statistical dimensions of
precision and accuracy are used to offer interpretations of empir-
ical studies of the relation between attention and consciousness.
The ﬁnal section brieﬂy offers some broader perspectives.
ASPECTS OF PREDICTION ERROR MINIMIZATION
Two things motivate the idea of the hypothesis testing brain: cast-
ing a core task for the brain in terms of causal inference, and then
appealing to the problem of induction.
The brain needs to represent the world so we can act meaning-
fully on it, that is, it has to ﬁgure out what in the world causes its
sensory input. Representation is thereby a matter of causal infer-
ence. Causal inference however is problematic since a many–many
relation holds between cause and effect: one cause can have many
different effects, and one effect can have many different causes.
This is the kernel of Hume’s problem of induction (Hume, 1739–
1740, Book I, Part III, Section vi): cause and effect are distinct
existences and there are no necessary connections between dis-
tinct existences. Only with the precarious help of experience can
the contingent links between them be revealed.
For the special case of the brain’s attempt to represent theworld,
the problem of induction concerns how causal inference can be
made “backwards” from the effects given in the sensory input to
the causes in the world. This is the inverse problem, and it has a
deep philosophical sting in the case of the brain. The brain never
has independent access to both cause and effect because to have
that it would already have had to solve the problem of repre-
sentation. So it cannot learn from experience by just correlating
occurrences of the two. It only has the effects to go by so must
somehow begin the representational task de novo.
The prediction errorminimization approach resolves this prob-
lem in time. The basic idea, described heuristically here, is simple
whereas the computational details are complex (Friston, 2010).
Sensory input is not just noise but has repeatable patterns. These
patterns can give rise to expectations about subsequent input. The
expectations can be compared to that subsequent input and the
difference between thembemeasured. If there is a tight ﬁt, then the
pattern generating the expectation has captured a pattern in the
real world reasonably well (i.e., the difference was close to expected
levels of irreducible noise). If the ﬁt is less good, that is, if there
is a sizeable prediction error, then the states and parameters of
the hypothesis or model of the world generating the expectation
should be revised so that subsequent expectations will, over time,
get closer to the actual input.
This idea canbe summedup in the simple dictum that to resolve
the inverse problem all that is needed is prediction error mini-
mization. Expected statistical patterns are furnished by generative
models of the world and instead of attempting the intractable task
of inverting these models to extract causes from generated effects,
prediction error minimization ensures that the model recapitu-
lates the causal structure of the world and is implicitly inverted;
providing a sufﬁcient explanation for sensory input.
This is consistent with a Bayesian scheme for belief revision
in the light of new evidence, and indeed both Bayes as well as
Laplace (before he founded classical frequentist statistics) devel-
oped their theories in response to the Humean-inspired inverse
problem (McGrayne, 2011). The idea is to weight credence in an
existing model of the world by how tightly it ﬁts the evidence (i.e.,
the likelihood or how well it predicts the input) as well as how
likely the model is in the ﬁrst place (i.e., the prior probability or
what the credence for the model was before the evidence came in).
The inverse problem is then resolvedbecause, even though there
is a many–many relation between causes in the world and sensory
effects, some of the relations are weighted more than others in an
optimally Bayesian way. The problem is solved de novo, without
presupposing prior representational capability, because the system
is supervised not by another agent, nor by itself, but by the very
statistical regularities in the world it is trying to represent.
This key idea is then embellished in a number of different ways,
all of which have bearing on attention and conscious perception.
HIERARCHY
The prediction error minimization mechanism sketched above is a
general type of statistical building block that is repeated through-
out levels of the cortical hierarchy such that there is recurrent mes-
sage passing between levels (Mumford, 1992). The input to the sys-
tem from the senses is conceived as prediction error and what can-
not be predicted at one level is passed on to the next. In general, low
levels of the hierarchy predict basic sensory attributes and causal
regularities at very fast, millisecond, time scales, and more com-
plex regularities, at increasingly slower time scales, are dealt with
at higher levels (Friston, 2008; Kiebel et al., 2008, 2010; Harrison
et al., 2011). Prediction error is concurrently minimized across all
levels of the hierarchy, and this unearths the states and parameters
that represent the causal structure and depth of the world.
CONTEXTUAL PROBABILITIES
Predictions at any level are subject to contextual modulation. This
can be via lateral connectivity, that is, by predictions or hypothe-
ses at the same hierarchical level, or it can be through higher level
control parameters shaping low level predictions by taking slower
time scale regularities into consideration. For example, the low
level dynamics of birdsong is controlled by parameters fromhigher
up pertaining to slower regularities about the size and strength of
the bird doing the singing (Kiebel et al., 2010). Similarly, it may be
that the role of gist perception is to provide contextual clues for
fast classiﬁcation of objects in a scene (Kveraga et al., 2007). The
entire cortical hierarchy thus recapitulates the causal structure of
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the world, and the bigger the hierarchy the deeper the represented
causal structure.
EMPIRICAL BAYES
For any appeal to Bayes, the question arises where do the priors
come from (Kersten et al., 2004)? One scheme for answering this,
and evading charges of excessive subjectivity, is empirical Bayes
where priors are extracted from hierarchical statistical learning
(see, e.g., Casella, 1992). In the predictive coding scheme this does
not mean going beyond Bayes to frequentism. (Empirical) Pri-
ors are sourced from higher levels in the hierarchy, assuming they
are learned in an optimally Bayesian fashion (Friston, 2005). The
notion of hierarchical inference is crucial here, and enables the
brain to optimize its prior beliefs on a moment to moment basis.
Many of these priors would be formed through long-term expo-
sure to sensory contingencies through a creature’s existence but it
is also likely that some priors aremore hard-wired and instantiated
over an evolutionary time-scale; different priors should therefore
be malleable to different extents by the creature’s sensation.
FREE ENERGY
In its most general formulation, prediction error minimization
is a special case of free energy minimization, where free energy
(the sum of squared prediction error) is a bound on information
theoretical surprise (Friston and Stephan, 2007). The free energy
formulation is important because it enables expansion of the ideas
discussed above to a number of different areas (Friston, 2010).
Here, it is mainly the relation to prediction error minimization
that will be of concern. Minimizing free energy minimizes pre-
diction error and implicitly surprise. The idea here is that the
organism cannot directly minimize surprise. This is because there
is an inﬁnite number of ways in which the organism could seek
to minimize surprise and it would be impossibly expensive to try
them out. Instead, the organism can test predictions against the
input from the world and adjust its predictions until errors are
suppressed. Even if the organism does not know what will sur-
prise it, it can minimize the divergence between its expectations
and the actual inputs encountered. A frequent objection to the
framework is that prediction error and free energy more generally
can be minimized by committing suicide since nothing surprises
a dead organism. The response is that the moment an organism
dies it experiences a massive increase in free energy, as it decom-
poses and is unable to predict anything (there is more to say on
this issue, see Friston et al., in press; there is also a substantial issue
surrounding how these types of ideas can be reconciled with evo-
lutionary ideas of survival and reproduction, for discussion see,
Badcock, 2012).
ACTIVE INFERENCE
A system without agency cannot minimize surprise but only opti-
mize its models of the world by revising those models to create
a tight free energy bound on surprise. To minimize the sur-
prise it needs to predict how the system’s own intervention in
the world (e.g., movement) could change the actual input such
as to minimize free energy. Agency, in this framework, is a mat-
ter of selectively sampling the world to ensure prediction error
minimization across all levels of the cortical prediction hierarchy
(Friston et al., 2009, 2011). To take a toy example: an agent sees a
new object such as a bicycle, the bound on this new sensory sur-
prise isminimized, and the ensuing favoredmodel of theworld lets
the agent predict how the prediction error landscape will change
given his or her intervention (e.g., when walking around the bike).
This prediction gives rise to a prediction error that is not min-
imized until the agent ﬁnds him or herself walking around the
bike, hence the label “active inference.” If the initial model was
wrong, then active inference fails to be this kind of self-fulﬁlling
prophecy (e.g., it was a cardboard poster of a bike). Depending on
the depth of the represented causal hierarchy this can give rise to
very structured behavior (e.g., not eating all your food now even
though you are hungry and instead keeping some for winter, based
on the prediction this will better minimize free energy).
There is an intuitive seesaw dynamic here between minimizing
the bound and actively sampling the world. It would be difﬁcult to
predict efﬁciently what kind of sampling would minimize surprise
if the starting pointwas a very poor, inaccurate, bound on surprise.
Similarly, insofar as selective sampling never perfectly minimizes
surprise, new aspects of the world are revealed, which should lead
to revisiting the bound on surprise. It thus pays for the system to
maintain both perceptual and active inference.
TOP-DOWN AND BOTTOM-UP
This framework comes with a re-conceptualization of the func-
tional roles of the bottom-up driving signal from the senses, and
the top-down or backward modulatory signal from higher lev-
els. The bottom-up signal is not sensory information per se but
instead just prediction error. The backward signal embodies the
causal model of the world and the bottom-up prediction error is
then essentially the supervisory feedback on the model (Friston,
2005). It is in this way the sensory input ensures the system is
supervised, not by someone else nor by itself, but by the statistical
regularities of the world.
The upshot is an elegant framework, which is primarily moti-
vated by principled, philosophical and computational concerns
about representation and causal inference. It is embellished in a
number of ways that capture many aspects of sensory process-
ing such as context-dependence, the role of prior expectations,
the way perceptual states comprise sensory attributes at different
spatiotemporal resolutions, and even agency. We shall appeal to
all these elements as predictive coding is applied to attention and
conscious perception.
PREDICTION ERROR AND PRECISION
As discussed above, there are two related ways that prediction
error can be minimized: either by changing the internal, gen-
erative model’s states, and parameters in the light of prediction
error, or keeping the model constant and selectively sampling the
world and thereby changing the input. Bothways enable themodel
to have what we shall here call accuracy : the more prediction
error is minimized, the more the causal structure of the world
is represented2.
2There is a simpliﬁcation here: surprise has both accuracy and complexity compo-
nents, such that minimizing surprise or free energy increases accuracy while mini-
mizing complexity. This ensures the explanations for sensory input are parsimonious
and will generalize to new situations; c.f., Occam’s razor.
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So far, this story leaves out a crucial aspect of perceptual infer-
ence concerning variability of the prediction error. Prediction
error minimization of the two types just mentioned assumes noise
to be constant, and the variability of all prediction errors therefore
the same.This assumptiondoesnot actually hold as noise oruncer-
tainty is state dependent. Prediction error that is unreliable due to
varying levels of noise in the states of the world is not a learning
signal that will facilitate conﬁdent veridical revision of generative
models or make it likely that selective sampling of the world is
efﬁcient. Prediction error minimization must therefore take vari-
ability in prediction error messaging into consideration – it needs
to assess the precision of the prediction error.
Predictions are tested in sensory sampling: given the gener-
ative model a certain input is predicted where this input can be
conceived as a distribution of sensory samples. If the actual distrib-
ution is different from the expected distribution, then a prediction
error is generated. One way to assess a difference in distributions
is to assess central tendency such as the mean. However, as is
standard in statistical hypothesis testing, even if the means seem
different (or not) the variability may preclude a conﬁdent con-
clusion that the two distributions are different (or not). Hence,
any judgment of difference must be weighed by the magnitude of
the variability – this is a requirement for trusting prediction error
minimization.
The inverse of variability is the precision (inverse dispersion
or variance) of the distribution. In terms of the framework used
here, when the system “decides”whether to revise internal models
in the light of prediction errors and to sample the world accord-
ingly, those errors are weighted by their precisions. For example,
a very imprecise (i.e., noisy, variable) prediction error should not
lead to revision, since it is more likely to be a random upshot of
noise for a given sensory attribute.
However, the rule cannot be simply that the more the precision
the stronger the weight of the prediction error. Our expectations
of precision are context dependent. For example, precisions in
different sensory modalities differ (for an example, see Bays and
Wolpert, 2007), and differ within the same modality in different
contexts and for different sensory attributes. Sometimes it may be
that one relatively broad, imprecise distribution should beweighed
more than another narrower, precise distribution. Similarly, an
unusually precise prediction error may be highly inaccurate as a
result of under-sampling, for example, and should not lead to revi-
sion. In general, the precision weighting should depend on prior
learning of regularities in the actual levels of noise in the states of
the world and the system itself (e.g., learning leading to internal
representations of the regularity that sensory precision tends to
decline at dusk).
There is then a (second order) perceptual inference prob-
lem because the magnitude of precision cannot be measured
absolutely. It must be assessed in the light of precision expecta-
tions. The consequence is that generative models must somehow
embody expectations for the precision of prediction error, in a
context dependent fashion. Crucially, the precision afforded a pre-
diction has to be represented; in other words, one has to represent
the known unknowns.
If precision expectations are optimized then prediction error is
weighted accurately and replicates the precisions in the world. In
terms of perceptual inference, the learning signal from the world
will havemoreweight fromunits expecting precision,whereas top-
down expectations will have more inﬂuence on perception when
processing concerns units expecting a lot of imprecision; one’s pre-
conceptions play a bigger role in making sense of the world when
the signal is deemed imprecise (Hesselmann et al., 2010). This
precision processing is thought to occur in synaptic error process-
ing such that units that expect precision will have more weight
(synaptic gain) than units expecting imprecision (Friston, 2009).
Given a noisy world and non-linear interactions in sensory
input, ﬁrst order statistics (prediction errors) and second order
statistics (the precisionof prediction errors) are thennecessary and
jointly sufﬁcient for resolving the inverse problem. Inwhat follows,
the optimization of representations is considered in terms of both
precision and accuracy, precision refers to the inverse amplitude
of random ﬂuctuations around, or uncertainty about, predictions;
while accuracy (with a slight abuse of terminology) will refer to
the inverse amplitude of prediction errors per se. Minimizing free
energy or surprise implies the minimization of precise prediction
errors; in other words, the minimization of the sum of squared
prediction error and an optimal estimate of precision.
Using the terminology of accuracy and precision is useful
because it suggests how the phenomena can come apart in a way
that will help in the interpretation of the relation between con-
sciousness and attention. It is a trivial point that precision and
accuracy can come apart: a measurement can be accurate but
imprecise, as in feeling the child’s fever with a hand on the fore-
head or it can be very precise but inaccurate, as when using an
ill calibrated thermometer. This yields two broad dimensions for
perceptual inference in terms of predictive coding: accuracy (via
expectation of sensory input) and precision (via expectation of
variability of sensory input). These can also come apart. Some of
the states and parameters of an internal model can be inaccurate
and yet precise (being conﬁdent that the sound comes from in
front of you when it really comes from behind, Jack and Thurlow,
1973). Or they can be accurate and yet, imprecise (correctly detect-
ing a faint sound but being uncertain aboutwhat to conclude given
a noisy background).
With this in mind, assume now that conscious perception is
determined by the prediction or hypothesis with the highest
overall posterior probability – which is overall best at minimiz-
ing prediction error (this assumption is given support in the
next section). That is, conscious perception is determined by the
strongest “attractor” in the free energy landscape; where, generally
speaking, greater precision leads to higher conditional conﬁdence
about the estimate and a deeper, more pronounced minimum in
the free energy landscape.
On this assumption, precision expectations play a key role
for conscious perception. We next note the proposal, which will
occupy us in much of the following, that optimization of precision
expectations maps on to attention (Friston, 2009). It is this map-
ping that will give substance to our understanding of the relation
between attention and consciousness. It is a promising approach
because precision processing, in virtue of its relation to accuracy,
has the kind of complex relation to prediction error minimiza-
tion that seems appropriate for capturing both the commonsense
notion that conscious perception and attention are intertwined
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and also the notion that they are separate mechanisms (Koch and
Tsuchiya, 2007; Van Boxtel et al., 2010).
We can usefully think of this in terms of a system such that,
depending on context (including experimental paradigms in the
lab), sensory estimates may be relatively accurate and precise,
inaccurate and imprecise, accurate and imprecise, or inaccurate
and precise. With various simpliﬁcations and assumptions, this
framework can then be sketched as in Figure 1.
By and large, conscious perception will be found for states that
are both accurate and precise but may also be found for states that
are relatively accurate and yet imprecise, and vice versa. Two or
more competing internal models or hypotheses about the world
can have different constellations of precision and accuracy: a rel-
atively inaccurate but precise model might determine conscious
perception over a competing accurate but imprecise model, and
vice versa. Similarly, a state can evolve in different ways: it can
for example begin by being very inaccurate and imprecise, and
thus not determining conscious perception but attention can raise
its conditional conﬁdence and ensure it does get to determine
conscious content.
On this framework, it should then also be possible to speak
to some of the empirical ﬁndings of dissociations between atten-
tion and consciousness. A case of attention without consciousness
would be where precision expectations are high for a state but
prediction error for it is not well minimized (expecting a pre-
cise signal, or, expecting inference to be relatively bottom-up
driven). A case of consciousness without attentionwould bewhere
FIGURE 1 | Schematic of statistical dimensions of conscious
perception.The accuracy afforded by ﬁrst order statistics refers to the
inverse amplitude of prediction errors per se, while the precision afforded
by second order statistics refers to the inverse amplitude of random
ﬂuctuations around, or uncertainty about, predictions. This allows for a
variety of different types of states such that in general, and depending on
context, inattentive but conscious states would cluster towards the lower
right corner and attentive but unconscious states would cluster towards the
upper left; see main text for further discussion.
prediction error is well minimized but where precision is relatively
low (expecting signals to be variable, or, expecting inference to be
relatively top-down driven). It is difﬁcult to say precisely what
such states would be like. For example, a conscious, inattentive
state might have a noisy, fuzzy proﬁle, such as gist perception
may have (Bar, 2007). It is also possible that increased reliance
on top-down, prior beliefs could in fact paradoxically sharpen
the representational proﬁle (Ross and Burr, 2008)3. In general, in
both types of cases, the outcome would be highly sensitive to the
context of the overall free energy landscape, that is, to competing
hypotheses and their precision expectations.
Section “Interpreting Empirical Findings in the Light of Atten-
tion as Precision Optimization”will begin the task of interpreting
some studies in the ﬁeld according to these accuracy and precision
dimensions. The next section, however, will provide some prima
facie motivation for this overall framework.
CONSCIOUS PERCEPTION AND ATTENTION AS DETERMINED
BY PRECISE PREDICTION ERROR MINIMIZATION
In this section, conscious perception and attention are dealt with
through the prism of predictive coding. Though the evidence in
favor of this approach is growing (see the excellent discussion in
Summerﬁeld and Egner, 2009) much of this is still speculative4.
The core idea is that conscious perception correlates with activ-
ity, spanning multiple levels of the cortical hierarchy, which best
suppresses precise prediction error: what gets selected for con-
scious perception is the hypothesis or model that, given the widest
context, is currently most closely guided by the current (precise)
prediction errors5.
Conscious perception can then thought to be at the service of
representing the world, and the currently best internal, generative
model is the one that most probably represents the causal struc-
ture of the world. Predictions by other models may also be able
to suppress prediction error, but less well, so they are not selected.
Conversely, often some other, possible models could be even bet-
ter at suppressing prediction error but if the system has not learnt
them yet, or cannot learn them, it must make do with the best
model it has.
It follows that the predictions of the currently best model can
actually be rather inaccurate. However, if it has no better competi-
tor then it will win and get selected for consciousness. Conscious
3There is also a very good question here about how this kind of conﬁdence assess-
ment ﬁts with the psychological conﬁdence of the organism, which appears a
deﬁning feature of consciousness, and which is often assessed in conﬁdence ratings.
(Thanks to a reviewer for raising this issue).
4A further disclaimer: the speculation that conscious perception is a product of
accuracy and precision in predictive coding is a limited speculation about an infor-
mation processing mechanism. It is not a speculation about why experience is
conscious rather than not conscious – predictive coding can after all be implemented
in unconscious machines. The mystery of consciousness will remain untouched.
5This claim depends on optimal Bayesian inference actually being able to recapit-
ulate the causal structure of the world. Here we bracket for philosophical debate
the fact that this assumption breaks down for perfect skeptical scenarios, such as
Cartesian deceiving demons or evil scientists manipulating brains in vats, where
minimizing free energy does not reveal the true nature of the world. We also bracket
deeper versions of the problem of induction, such as the new riddle of induction
(Goodman, 1955). though we note that when two hypotheses are equally good at
predicting new input the free energy principle prefers the one with the smallest
complexity cost.
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perception can then be far from veridical, in spite of its represen-
tational nature. This makes room for an account of illusory and
hallucinatory perceptual content, which is an important desider-
atum on accounts of conscious perception. These would be cases
where, for different reasons, poor models are best at precisely
explaining away incoming data only because their competitors
are even poorer.
The job of the predictive coding system is to attenuate sensory
input by treating it as information theoretical surprise and pre-
dicting it as perfectly as possible. As the surprise is attenuated,
models should stop being revised and predictive activity progres-
sively cease throughout the hierarchy. This seems consistent with
repetition suppression (Grill-Spector et al., 2006) where neural
activity ceases in response to expected input in a manner con-
sistent with prediction error minimization (Summerﬁeld et al.,
2008; Todorovic et al., 2011). At the limit it should have conse-
quences for conscious perception too. When all the surprise is
dealt with, prediction and model revision should cease. If it is
also impossible to do further selective sampling then conscious
perception of the object in question should cease. This follows
from the idea that what we are aware of is the “fantasy” gener-
ated by the way current predictions attenuate prediction error; if
there is no prediction error to explain away, then there is nothing
to be aware of. Presumably there is almost always some input to
some consumer systems in the brain (including during dreaming)
but conceivably something close to this happens when stabilized
retinal images fade from consciousness (Ditchburn and Ginsborg,
1952). Because such stimuli move with eye and head movement
predictive exploration of them is quickly exhausted.
Conscious perception is often rich in sensory attributes, which
are neatly bound together even though they are processed in a
distributed manner throughout the brain. The predictive cod-
ing account offers a novel approach to this “binding” aspect of
conscious perception. Distributed sensory attributes are bound
together by the causal inference embodied in the parameters of
the generative model. The model assumes, for example, that there
is a red ball out there so will predict that the redness and the
bouncing object co-occur spatiotemporally. The binding problem
(Treisman, 1996) is then dealt with by default: the system does not
have to operate in a bottom-up fashion and ﬁrst process individual
attributes and then bind them. Instead, it assumes bound attrib-
utes and then predicts them down through the cortical hierarchy.
If they are actually bound in the states of the world, then this will
minimize prediction error, and they will be experienced as such.
It is a nice question here what it means for the model with the
highest posterior probability to be “selected for consciousness.”
We can only speculate about an answer but it appears that on the
predictive coding framework there does not have to be a speciﬁc
selection mechanism (no “threshold” module, cf. Dennett, 1991).
When a speciﬁc model is the one determining the consciously per-
ceived content it is just because it best minimizes prediction error
across most levels of the cortical hierarchy – it best represents the
world given all the evidence and the widest possible context. This
is the model that should be used to selectively sample the world to
minimize surprise in active inference. Competing but less proba-
ble models cannot simultaneously determine the target of active
inference: the models would be at cross-purposes such that the
system would predict more surprise than if it relies on one model
alone (for more on the relation between attention and action, see
Wu, 2011).
Though there remain aspects of consciousness that seem dif-
ﬁcult to explain, such as the conscious content of imagery and
dreaming, this overall approach to conscious perception does then
promise to account for a number of key aspects of consciousness.
The case being built here is mainly theoretical. There is not yet
much empirical evidence for this link to conscious perception,
though a recent dynamical causal modeling study from research
in disorders of consciousness (vegetative states andminimally con-
scious states) suggests that what is required for an individual to be
in an overall conscious state is for them to have intact connectivity
consistent with predictive coding (Boly et al., 2011).
As we saw earlier, in the normal course of events, the system is
helped in this prediction errorminimization task by precision pro-
cessing,which (following Feldman and Friston, 2010) was claimed
to map on to attention such that attention is precision optimiza-
tion in hierarchical perceptual inference. A prediction error signal
will have a certain absolute dispersion but whether the system
treats this as precise or not depends on its precision expectations,
whichmaydiffer dependingon context andbeliefs about prior pre-
cision. Precise prediction errors are reliable signals and therefore,
as described earlier, enable amore efﬁcient revision of themodel in
question (i.e., a tighter bound and better active inference). If that
model then, partly resulting from precision optimization, achieves
the highest posterior probability, it will determine the content of
conscious perception. This begins to capture the functional role
often ascribed to attention of being a gating or gain mechanism
that somehow optimizes sensory processing (Hillyard and Man-
gun, 1987; Martinez-Trujillo and Treue, 2004). As shall be argued
now, it can reasonably account for a wider range of characteristics
of attention.
EXOGENOUS ATTENTION
Stimuli with large spatial contrast and/or temporal contrast
(abrupt onset) tend to“grab”attentionbottom-up,or exogenously.
These are situations where there is a relatively high level of sensory
input, that is, a stronger signal. Given an expectation that stronger
signals have better signal to noise ratio (better precision), than
weaker signals (Feldman and Friston, 2010, p. 9; Appendix), error
units exposed to such signals should thus expect high precision
and be given larger gain. As a result, more precise prediction error
can be suppressed by the model predicting this new input, which
is then more likely to be the overall winner populating conscious
experience. Notice that this account does not mention expecta-
tions about what the signal stems from, only about the signal’s
reliability. Also notice that this account does not guarantee that
what has the highest signal to noise ratio will end up populating
consciousness, it may well be that other models have higher overall
conﬁdence or posterior probability.
ENDOGENOUS ATTENTION
Endogenous attention is driven more indirectly by probabilistic
context. Beginning with endogenous cueing, a central cue point-
ing left is itself represented with high precision prediction error
(it grabs attention) and in the parameters of the generative model
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this cue representation is related to the representation of a stimu-
lus to the left, via a learned causal link. This reduces uncertainty
about what to predict there (increases prior probability for a left
target) and it induces an expectation of high precision for that
region. When the stimulus arrives, the resulting gain on the error
units together with the higher prior help drive a higher condi-
tional conﬁdence for it, making it likely it is quickly selected for
conscious perception.
The idea behind endogenous attention is then that it works as
an increase in baseline activity of neuronal units encoding beliefs
about precision. There is evidence that such increase in activity
prior to stimulus onset is speciﬁc to precision expectations. The
narrow distributions associated with precise processing tell us that
in detection tasks the precision-weighted system should tend to
respond when and only when the target appears. And indeed such
baseline increases do bias performance in favor of hits and cor-
rect rejections (Hesselmann et al., 2010). In contrast, if increased
baseline activity had instead been a matter of mere accumulation
of evidence for a speciﬁc stimulus (if it had been about accuracy
and not precision), then the baseline increase should instead have
biased toward hits and false alarms.
A recent paper directly supports the role of endogenous atten-
tion as precision weighting (Kok et al., 2011). As we have seen,
without attention, the better a stimulus is predicted the more
attenuated its associated signal should be.Attention should reverse
this attenuation because it strengthens the prediction error. How-
ever, attention depends on the predictability of the stimulus: there
should be no strong expectation that an unpredicted stimulus
is going to be precise. So there should be less attention-induced
enhancement of the prediction error for unpredicted stimuli than
for better predicted stimuli. Using fMRI, Kok et al. very elegantly
provides evidence for this interaction in early visual cortex (V1).
In more traditional cases of endogenous attention (e.g., the
individual deciding herself to attend left) the cue can be conceived
as a desired state, for example, that something valuable will be
spotted to the left. This would then generate an expectation of
precision for that region such that stimuli located there are more
likely to be detected. Endogenous attention of this sort has a voli-
tional aspect: the individual decides to attend and acts on this
decision. Such agency can range from sensorimotor interaction
and experimentation to a simple decision to ﬁxate on something.
This agential aspect suggests that part of attention should belong
with active inference (selective sampling to minimize surprise).
The idea here would be that the sampling is itself subject to
precision weighting. This makes sense since the system will not
know if its sampling satisﬁes expectations unless it can assess the
variability in the sampling. Without such an assessment, the sys-
tem will not know whether to keep sampling on the basis of a
given model or whether the bound on the model itself needs to
be re-assessed. In support of this, there is emerging evidence that
precision expectations are also involved inmotor behavior (Brown
et al., 2011).
BIASED COMPETITION
An elegant approach to attention begins with the observation
that neurons respond optimally to one object or property in
their receptive ﬁeld so that if more than one object is present,
activity decreases unless competition between them is resolved.
The thought is that attention can do this job, by biasing one inter-
pretation over another (Desimone and Duncan, 1995). Attention
is thus required to resolve ambiguities of causal inference incurred
by the spatial architecture of the system.Accordingly, electrophysi-
ological studies show decreased activity when two different objects
are present in a neuron’s receptive ﬁeld, and return to normal
levels of activity when attention is directed toward one of them
(Desimone, 1998).
The predictive coding framework augmented with precision
expectations should be able to encompass biased competition.
This is because, as mentioned, precision can modulate percep-
tual inference when there are two or more competing, and perhaps
equally accurate,models. Indeed, computational simulation shows
precision-weighted predictive coding can play such a biasing role
in a competitive version of the Posner paradigm where attention
is directed to a cued peripheral stimulus rather than a competing
non-cued stimulus. A central cue thus provides a context for the
model containing the cued stimulus as a hidden cause. This dri-
ves a high precision expectation for that location, which ensures
relatively large gain, and quicker response times, when those error
units are stimulated. This computational model nicely replicates
psychophysics and electrophysiological ﬁndings (Feldman and
Friston, 2010, pp. 14–15).
Attentional competition is then not a matter somehow of
intrinsically limited processing resources or of explicit compe-
tition. It is a matter of optimal Bayesian inference where only
one model of the causal regularities in the world can best explain
away the incoming signal, given prior learning, and expectations
of state-dependent levels of noise.
Binding of sensory attributes by a cognitive system was mooted
above as a natural element of predictive coding. Attention is also
thought to play a role for binding (Treisman and Gelade, 1980;
Treisman, 1998) perhaps via gamma activity (Treisman, 1999)
such that synchronized neurons are given greater gain. Again, this
can be cast in terms of precision expectations: sensory attributes
bound to the same object are mutually predictive and so if the
precision-weighted gain for one is increased it should increase for
the other too. Though this is speculative, the predictive coding
framework could here elucidate the functional role of increased
gamma activity and help us understand how playing this role
connects to attention and conscious perception.
Perhaps we should pause brieﬂy and ask why we should adopt
this framework for attention in particular – what does it add to
our understanding of attention to cast it in terms of precision
expectations? A worry could be that it is more or less a trivial
reformulation of notions of gain, gating, and bias, which has long
been used to explicate attention in a more or less aprioristic man-
ner. The immediate answer is that this account of attention goes
beyond mere reformulations of known theories, not just because
its basic element is precision, but also because it turns on learning
precision regularities in the world so different contexts will elicit
different precision expectations. This is crucial because optimiza-
tion of precision is context dependent and thus requires appeal to
just the kind of predictive framework used here.
There is also a more philosophical motivation for adopting this
approach. Normally, an account of attention would begin with
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some kind of operational, conceptual analysis of the phenomenon:
attention has to do with salience, with some kind of selection
of sensory channels, resource limitations, and so on. Then the
evidence is consulted and theories formulated about neural mech-
anisms that could underpin salience and selection etc. This is a
standard and fruitful approach in science. But sometimes taking a
much broader approach gives a better understanding of the nature
of the phenomenonof interest and its relation to other phenomena
(cf. explanation by uniﬁcation, Kitcher, 1989). In our case, a very
general conception of the fundamental computational task for the
brain deﬁnes two functional roles that must be played: estimation
of states and parameters, and estimation of precisions. Without
beginning from a conceptual analysis of attention, we then dis-
cover that the element of precision processing maps on well to
the functional role we associate with attention. This discovery tells
us something new about the nature of attention: the reason why
salience and selection of sensory channels matter, and the reason
why there appears to be resource limitations on attention, is that
the system as such must assess precisions of sensory estimates and
weight them against each other.
Viewing attention from the independent vantage point of the
requirements of predictive coding also allows us to revise the
concept of attention somewhat, which can often be fruitful. For
example, there is no special reason why attention should always
have to do with conscious perception, given the ways precision
and accuracy can come apart; that is, there may well be precision
processing – attention – outside consciousness. The approach sug-
gests a new way for us to understand how attention and perception
can rely on separate but related mechanisms. This is the kind of
issue to which we now turn.
INTERPRETING EMPIRICAL FINDINGS IN THE LIGHT OF
ATTENTION AS PRECISION OPTIMIZATION
The framework for conscious perception sketched in Section“Pre-
diction Error and Precision” (see Figure 1) implied that studies of
the relation between consciousness and attention can be located
according to the dimensions of accuracy and precision. We now
explore if this implication can reasonably be said to hold for a set
of key ﬁndings concerning: inattentional blindness, change blind-
ness, the effects of short term and sustained covert attention on
conscious perception, and attention to unconscious stimuli.
The tools for interpreting the relevant studies must be guided
by the properties of predictive coding framework we have set out
above, so here we brieﬂy recapitulate: (1) even though accuracy
and precision are both necessary for conscious perception, it does
not follow that the single most precise or the most accurate esti-
mate in a competing ﬁeld of estimates will populate consciousness:
that is determined by the overall free energy landscape. For exam-
ple, it is possible for the highest overall posterior probability to be
determined by an estimate having high accuracy and relatively low
precision even if there is anothermodel available that has relatively
low accuracy yet high precision, and so on. (2) Attention in the
shape of precision expectation modulates prediction error mini-
mization subject to precisions predicted by the context, including
cues and competing stimuli; it can do this for prediction errors
of different accuracies. (3) Precision weighting only makes sense
if weights sum to one so that as one goes up the others must go
down. Similarly, as the probability of one model goes up the prob-
ability of other models should go down – the other models are
explained away if one model is able to account for and suppress
the sensory input. This gives rise to model competition. (4) Con-
scious experience of unchanging, very stable stimuli will tend to
be suppressed over time, as prediction error is explained away and
no new error arises. (5) Agency is active inference: a model of the
agent’s interaction with the world is used to selectively sample the
world such as to minimize surprise. This also holds for volitional
aspects of attention, such as the agency involved in endogenous
attention to a spatial location.
The aim now is to use these properties of predictive coding
to provide a coherent interpretation of the set of very different
ﬁndings on attention and consciousness.
TYPES OF INATTENTIONAL BLINDNESS
The context for a stimulus can be a cue or an instruction or other
sensory information, or perhaps a decision to attend. Various ele-
ments of this context can give a speciﬁc generative model two
advantages: it can increase priors for its states and parameters (for
this part of the view, see also Rao, 2005) and it can bias selection
of that model via precision weighting. When the target stimulus
comes, attention has thus already given the model for that stimu-
lus a probabilistic advantage. If in contrast the context is invalid
(non-predictive) and a different target stimulus occurs, the start-
ing point for the model predicting it can be much lower both in
terms of prior probability and in terms of precision expectation.
If this lower starting point is sufﬁciently low, and if the invalidly
contextualized stimulus is not itself strongly attention grabbing
(is not abrupt in some feature space such as having sharp contrast
or temporal onset), then “the invalid target may never actually be
perceived” (Feldman and Friston, 2010, pp. 9–10).
This is then what could describe forms of inattentional blind-
ness where an otherwise visible stimulus is made invisible by
attending to something at a different location: an attentional task
helps bias one generative model over models for unexpected back-
ground or peripheral stimuli. A very demanding attentional task
would have very strong bias from precision weighting, and corre-
spondingly the weight given to other models must be weakened.
This could drive overall posterior probability below selection for
consciousness, such that not even the gist of, for example, brieﬂy
presented natural scenes is perceived.
It is natural to conclude in such experiments that attention is
a necessary condition for conscious perception since unattended
stimuli are not seen, and as soon as they are seen performance
on the central task decreases (Cohen et al., 2011). This is right
in the sense that any weighting of precision to the peripheral or
background stimulus must go with decreased weight to the central
task. However, the more fundamental truth here is that in a noisy
world precision weighting is necessary for conscious perception
so that at the limit, where noise expectations are uniform, there
could be conscious perception even though attention plays very
little actual role.
When inattentional blindness is less complete, the gist of brieﬂy
presented natural scenes can be perceived (see, Van Boxtel et al.,
2010). This is consistent with relatively low precision expectation
since gist is by deﬁnition imprecise. So in this case some, but
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relatively little prediction error is allowed through for the natural
scene, leaving only little prediction error to explain away. It seems
likely that this could give rise to gist rather than full perception.
However, the distinction between gist and full perception is not
well understood and there are more speciﬁc views on gist per-
ception, also within the broad predictive coding framework (Bar,
2003).
In some cases of inattentional blindness, large and otherwise
very salient stimuli can go unnoticed. Famously, when counting
basketball passes a gorilla can be unseen, and when chasing some-
one a nearby ﬁstﬁght can be unseen (Simons and Chabris, 1999;
Chabris et al., 2011). This is somewhat difﬁcult to explain because
endogenous attention as described so far should raise the baseline
for precision expectation for a speciﬁc location such that any stim-
ulus there, whether it is a basketball pass or a gorilla, should be
more likely to be perceived. A smaller proportion of participants
experience this effect, so it does in fact seem harder to induce
blindness in this kind of paradigm than paradigms using central–
peripheral or foreground-background tasks. For those who do
have inattentional blindness under these conditions, the explana-
tion could be high precision expectations for the basketball passes
speciﬁcally, given the context of the passes that have occurred
before the gorilla enters. This combines with the way this precision
error has driven up the conditional conﬁdence of the basketball
model, explaining away the gorilla model, even if the latter is fed
some prediction error. This more speculative account predicts that
inattentional blindness should diminish if the gorilla, for example,
occurs at the beginning of the counting task.
This is then a way to begin conceptualizing feature- and object-
based based attention instead of purely spatial attention. Van
Boxtel et al. (2010) suggest that in gorilla type cases the context
provided by the overall scene delivers a strong gist that overrides
changes that ﬁt poorly with it: “subjects do perceive the gist of
the image correctly, interfering with detection of a less meaningful
change in the scene as if it was ﬁlled in by the gist.” The pre-
dictive coding approach can offer an explanation of this kind of
interference in probabilistic terms.
A further aspect can be added to this account of inattentional
blindness. Attending, especially endogenous attending, is an activ-
ity. As such, performing an attention demanding task is a matter
of active inference where a model of the world is used to selectively
sample sensory input to minimize surprise. This means that high
precision input are expected and sampled on the basis of one, ini-
tial (e.g.,“basketball”)model, leaving unexpected input such as the
occurrence of a gorilla with low weighting. Since the active infer-
ence required to comply with an attentional task must favor one
model in a sustained way, blindness to unexpected stimuli follows.
The beneﬁt of sustained attention viewed as active inference is
then that surprise can be minimized with great precision, given
an initial model’s states and parameters. On the other hand, the
cost of sustained attention is that the prediction error landscape
may change during the task; increasing the free energy and making
things evade consciousness.
It can thus be disadvantageous for a system to be stuck in
active inference and neglecting to revisit the bound on surprise
by updating the model (e.g., if the gorilla is real and angry). Per-
haps the reason attention can be hard to maintain is that to avoid
such disadvantage the system continually seeks, perhaps via spon-
taneous ﬂuctuations, to alternate between perceptual and active
inference. Minor lapses of attention (e.g., missing a pass) could
thus lead to some model revision and conscious perception; if the
model revision has relatively low precision it may just give rise to
gist perception (e.g., “some black creature was there”).
It is interesting here to speculate further that the functional role
of exogenous attention can be to not only facilitate processing of
salient stimuli but in particular to make the system snap out of
active inference, which is often associated with endogenous atten-
tion, and back into revision of its generative model. Exogenous
and endogenous attention seem to have opposing functional roles
in precision optimization.
There remains the rather important and difﬁcult question
whether or not the unseen stimulus is in fact consciously perceived
but not accessible for introspective report, or whether it is not
consciously perceived at all; this question relates to the inﬂuential
distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal con-
sciousness (Block, 1995, 2008). To some, this question borders on
the incomprehensible or at least untestable (Cohen and Dennett,
2011), and there is agreement it cannot be answered directly (e.g.,
by asking participants to report). Instead some indirect, abduc-
tive answer must be sought. We cannot answer this question here
but we can speculate that the common intuition that there is both
access and phenomenal consciousness is fueled by the moments
of predictive coding such that (i) access consciousness goes with
active inference (i.e., minimizing surprise though agency, which
requires making model parameters and states available to control
systems), and (ii) phenomenal consciousness goes with percep-
tual inference (i.e., minimizing the bound on surprise by more
passively updating model parameters and states).
If this is right, then a prediction is that in passive viewing,where
attention and active inference is kept as minimal as possible, there
should be more possibility of having incompatible conscious per-
cepts at the same time, since without active inference there is less
imperative to favor just one initial model. There is some evidence
for this in binocular rivalry where the absence of attention seems
to favor fusion (Zhang et al., 2011).
Overall, some inroads on inattentional blindness can be made
by an appeal to precision expectations giving the attended stimulus
a probabilistic advantage.Amore full, and speculative, explanation
conceives attention in agential terms and appeals to the way active
inference can lead to very precise but eventually overall inaccurate
perceptual states.
CHANGE BLINDNESS
These are cases where abrupt and scene-incongruent changes like
sudden mudsplashes attract attention and make invisible other
abrupt but scene-congruent changes like a rock turning into a log
or an aircraft engine going missing (Rensink et al., 1997). Only
with attention directed at (or on repeated exposures grabbed by)
the scene-congruent change will it be detected. This makes sense if
the distractor (e.g., mudsplashes) has higher signal strength than
the masked stimuli because, as we saw, there is a higher precision
expectation for stronger signals. This weights prediction error for a
mudsplashmodel rather than for a natural scenerymodelwith logs
or aircrafts. Even if both models are updated in the light of their
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respective prediction errors from the mudsplashes and the rock
changing to the log, the mudsplash model will have higher con-
ditional conﬁdence because it can explain away precisely a larger
part of the bottom-up error signal.
More subtly, change blindness through attention grabbing
seems to require that the abrupt stimuli activate a competing
model of the causes in the world. This means that the prediction
error can be relevant to the states and parameters of one of these
models. Thus, the mudsplashes mostly appear to be superimposed
on the original image,which activates a model with parameters for
causal interaction between mudsplashes and something like a sta-
tic photo. In other words, the best explanation for the visual input
is the transient occlusion or change to a photo, where, crucially,
we have strong prior beliefs that photographs do not change over
short periods of time. This contrasts with the situation prior to the
mudsplashes occurring where the model would be tuned more to
the causal relations inherent in the scene itself (that is, the entire
scene is not treated as a unitary object that can be mudsplashed).
With two models, one can begin to be probabilistically explained
away by the other: as the posterior probability of the model that
treats the scene as a unitary object increases, the probability of
the model that treats it as composite scene will go down. Once
change blindness is abolished, such that both mudsplashes and
scene changes are seen, a third (“Photoshop”) model will have
evolved on which individual components can change but not nec-
essarily in a scene-congruent manner. All this predicts that there
should be less change blindness formudsplashes on dynamic stim-
uli such as movies because the causal model for such stimuli has
higher accuracy; it also predicts less blindness if the mudsplashes
aremeaningful in theoriginal scene such that competitionbetween
models is not engendered.
For some scene changes it is harder to induce change blind-
ness. Mudsplashes can blind us when a rock in the way of a kayak
changes into a log, but blinds us less when the rock changes into
another kayak (Sampanes et al., 2008). This type of situation is
often dealt with in terms of gist changes but it is also consistent
with the interpretation given above. The difference between a log
and another kayak in the way of the kayak is in the change in para-
meters of the model explaining away the prediction error. The
change from an unmoving object (rock) to another unmoving
object (log) incurs much less model revision than the change to
a moving, intentional object (other kayak): the scope for causal
interaction between two kayaks is much bigger than for one kayak
and a log. The prediction error is thus much bigger for the latter,
and updating the model to reﬂect this will increase its probability
more, and make blindness less likely.
Adifferent type of change blindness occurswhen there is nodis-
tractor but the change is very slow and incremental (e.g., Simons
et al., 2000), such as a painting where one part changes color over
a relatively long period of time. Without attention directed at the
changing property, the change is not noted. In this case it seems
likely that each incremental change is within the expected variabil-
ity for the model of the entire scene. When attention is directed at
the slowly changing component of the scene, the precision expec-
tation and thus the weighting goes up, and it is more likely that
the incremental change will generate a prediction error. This is
then an example of change blindness due to imprecise prediction
error minimization. If this is right, a prediction is that change of
precision expectation through learning, or individual differences
in such expectations, should affect this kind of change blindness.
SHORT TERM COVERT ATTENTION ENHANCES CONSCIOUS
PERCEPTION
If a peripheral cue attracts covert attention to a grating away from
ﬁxation, then conscious experience of its contrast is enhanced
(Carrasco et al., 2004). Similar effects are found for spatial fre-
quency and gap size (Gobell and Carrasco, 2005). In terms of
precision, the peripheral cue induces a high precision expectation
for the cued region, which increases the weighting for prediction
error from the low contrast grating placed there. Speciﬁcally, the
expectation will be for a stimulus with an improved signal to noise
ratio, that is, a stronger signal. This then seems to be a kind of self-
fulﬁlling prophecy: an expectation for a strong bottom-up signal
causing a stronger error signal. The result is that the world is being
represented as having a stronger, more precise signal than it really
has, and this is then reﬂected in conscious perception.
From this perspective, the attentional effect is parasitic on
a causal regularity in the world. Normally, when attention is
attracted to a region there will indeed be a high signal to noise
event in that region. This is part of the prediction error minimiza-
tion role for attention described above. If this regularity did not
hold, then exogenous attention would be costly in free energy. In
this way the effect fromCarrasco’s lab is a kind of attentional visual
illusion. A further study provides evidence for just this notion of
an invariant relation between cue strength and expectation for
subsequent signal strength: the effect is weakened as the cue con-
trast decreases (Fuller et al., 2009). The cue sets up an expectation
for high signal strength (i.e., high precision) in the region and so
it makes sense that the cue strength and the expectation are tied
together. It is thus an illusion because a causal regularity about
precision is applied to a case where it does not in fact hold. If it is
correct that this effect relies on learned causal regularities, then it
can be predicted that the effect should be reversible through learn-
ing, such that strong cues come to be associated with expectations
for imprecise target stimuli and vice versa6.
At the limit, this paradigm provides an example of attention
directed at subthreshold stimuli, and thereby enabling their selec-
tion into conscious perception (e.g., 3.5% contrast subthreshold
grating is perceived as a 6% contrast threshold grating (Carrasco
et al., 2004). This showsnicely themodulationbyprecisionweight-
ing of the overall free energy landscape: prediction error, which
initially is so imprecise that it is indistinguishable from expected
noise can be up-weighted throughprecision expectations such that
the internal model is eventually revised to represent it. Paradoxi-
cally, however, here what we have deemed an attentional illusion
of stimulus precision facilitates veridical perception of stimulus
occurrence.
6It is a tricky questionwhether or not this attentional effect is then explainedwithout
appealing to “mental paint” (Block, 2010), and whether it is therefore a challenge to
representationalism about conscious perception. Precision optimization is an inte-
gral part of perceptual inference, which is all about representing the causal structure
of the world. As such the explanation is representational. But it concerns preci-
sion, which is an often neglected aspect of representation: the representationalism
assumed here allows that a relatively accurate representation can fail to optimize
precision. What attention itself affords is improved precision, not accuracy (see
Prinzmetal et al., 1997).
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It is an interesting question if the self-fulﬁlling prophecy sug-
gested to be in play here is always present under attention, such
that attention perpetually enhances phenomenology. In predic-
tive coding terms, the answer is probably “no.” The paradigm is
unusual in the sense that it is a case of covert attention, which sti-
ﬂes normal active inference in the form of ﬁxation shifts. If central
ﬁxation is abolished and the low contrast grating is ﬁxated, the
bound on free energy is again minimized, and this time the error
between the model and the actual input from the grating is likely
to override the expectation for a strong signal.
This attentional illusion works for exogenous cueing but also
for endogenous cueing (Liu et al., 2009),where covert endogenous
attention is ﬁrst directed at a peripheral letter cue, is sustained
there, and then enhances the contrast of the subsequent target
grating at that location. There does not seem to be any studies of
the effect of endogenous attention that is entirely volitional and
not accompanied by high contrast cues in the target region (even
Ling and Carrasco, 2006 has high contrast static indicators at the
target locations).
From the point of view of predictive coding, the prediction is
then that there will be less enhancing effect of such pure endoge-
nous attention since the high precision expectation (increased
baseline) in this case is not induced via a learned causal regularity
linking strong signal cues to strong signal targets.
A more general prediction follows from the idea that attention
is driven by the (hyper-) prior that cues with high signal strength
have high signal to noise ratio. It may be possible to revert this
prior through learning such that attention eventually is attracted
by low strength cues and stronger cues are ignored. In support
of this prediction, there is evidence that some hyperpriors can be
altered, such as the light from above prior (Morgenstern et al.,
2011).
This attentional effect is then explained by precision opti-
mization leading to an illusory perceptual inference. It is a case
of misrepresented high precision combined with relatively low
accuracy.
SUSTAINED COVERT ATTENTION DIMINISHES CONSCIOUS
PERCEPTION AND ENHANCES FILLING-IN
In Troxler fading (Troxler, 1804) peripheral targets fade out of con-
scious perception during sustained central ﬁxation. If attention
but not ﬁxation is endogenously directed at one type of sensory
attribute, such as the color of some of the peripheral stimuli, then
those stimuli fade faster than the unattended stimuli (Lou, 1999).
It is interesting that here attention seems to diminish conscious
perception whereas in the cases discussed in the previous section it
enhances it. A key factor here is the duration of trials: fading occurs
after several seconds and enhancement is seen in trials lasting only
1–2 s. This temporal signature is consistent with predictive coding
insofar aswhen the prediction error froma stimulus is comprehen-
sively suppressed and no further exploration is happening (since
active inference is subdued due to central ﬁxation during covert
attention) probability should begin to drop. This follows from the
idea that what drives conscious perception is the actual process of
suppressing prediction error. It translates to the notion that the
system expects that the world cannot be unchanging for very long
periods of time (Hohwy et al., 2008).
In Troxler fading there is an element of ﬁlling-in as the fading
peripheral stimuli are substituted by the usually gray background.
This ﬁlling-in aspect is seen more dramatically if the background
is dynamic (De Weerd et al., 2006): as sustained attention dimin-
ishes perception of the peripheral target stimuli, it also ampliﬁes
conscious perception by illusory ﬁlling-in. A similar effect is seen
in motion induced blindness (MIB). Here peripheral targets fade
when there is also a stimulus of coherently moving dots, and the
fading of the peripheral dots happens faster when they are covertly
attended (Geng et al., 2007; Schölvinck and Rees, 2009).
The question is then why attention conceived as precision
weighting should facilitate the fading of target stimuli together
with enhancing ﬁlling-in in these cases. In Troxler fading with
ﬁlling-in of dynamic background as well as in MIB there is an ele-
ment of model competition. In MIB, there is competition between
a model representing the coherently moving dots as a solid rotat-
ing disk, which if real would occlude the stationary target dots,
and a model representing isolated moving dots, which would not
occlude the target dots. The ﬁrst model wins due to the coherence
of the motion. An alternative explanation is that there is compe-
tition between a model on which there is an error (a “perceptual
scotoma”) in the visual system, and a model where there is not;
in the former case, it would make sense for the system to ﬁll-
in (New and Scholl, 2008). In the Troxler case with a dynamic
background, there is competition between models representing
the world as having vs. not having gaps at the periphery, with the
latter tending to win. Sustained attention increases the precision
weighting for all prediction error from the attended region, that
is, for both the target stimuli and the context in which they are
shown (i.e., the dynamic background or, as in MIB, the coher-
ently moving foreground). This context is processed not only at
that region but also globally in the stimulus array and this would
boost the conﬁdence that it ﬁlls the locations of the target stimuli.
This means that as the prediction error for the peripheral target
stimuli is explained away, the probabilistic balance might tip in
favor of the model that represents the array as having an unbro-
ken background, or a solid moving foreground (or a perceptual
scotoma).
It is thus possible to accommodate these quite complex effects
of covert attention within the notion of attention as precision
expectation. On the one hand, exogenous cues can engender high
precision expectations that can facilitate target perception, and,
on the other hand these expectations can facilitate ﬁlling-in of the
target location. At the same time, covert attention stiﬂes active
inference and engenders a degree of inaccuracy.
EXOGENOUS ATTENTION TO INVISIBLE STIMULI
During continuous ﬂash suppression, perceptually suppressed
images of nudes can attract attention in the sense that they func-
tion as exogenous cues in a version of the Posner paradigm (Jiang
et al., 2006). This shows that a key attentional mechanism works
in the absence of conscious perception.When there are competing
models, conscious perception is determined by the model with
the highest posterior probability. It is conceivable that though the
nude image is a state in a losingmodel itmay still induce precision-
related gain for a particular region. In general, in the processing
of emotional stimuli, there is clear empirical evidence to suggest
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that fast salient processing (that could mediate optimization of
precision expectations) can be separated from slower perceptual
classiﬁcation (Vuilleumier et al., 2003). Evidence for this sepa-
ration rests on the differences in visual pathways, in terms of
processing speeds and spatial frequencies that may enable the
salience of stimuli to be processed before their content. Even
though a high precision expectation could thus be present for
the region of the suppressed stimulus, it is possible for the overall
prediction error landscape to not favor the generative model for
that stimulus over the model for the abruptly ﬂashing Mondrian
pattern in the other eye. The result is that the nude image is not
selected for conscious perception but that there nevertheless is
an expectation of high precision for its region of the visual ﬁeld,
explaining the effect.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The relation between conscious perception and attention is poorly
understood. It has proven difﬁcult to connect the two bodies of
empirical ﬁndings, based as they are on separate conceptual analy-
ses of each of these core phenomena, and ﬁt them into one uniﬁed
picture of our mental lives. In this kind of situation, it can be use-
ful to instead begin with a uniﬁed theoretical perspective, apply
it to the phenomena at hand and then explore if it is possible
to reasonably interpret the bodies of evidence in the light of the
theory.
This is the strategy pursued here. The idea that the brain
is a precision-weighted hypothesis tester provides an attrac-
tive vision of the relationship. Because the states of the world
have varying levels of noise or uncertainty, perceptual infer-
ence must be modulated by expectations about the precisions
of the sensory signal (i.e., of the prediction error). Optimiza-
tion of precision expectations, it turns out (Feldman and Friston,
2010), ﬁts remarkably well the functional role often associated
with attention. And the perceptual inference which, thus mod-
ulated by attention, achieves the highest posterior probability
ﬁts nicely with being what determines the contents of conscious
perception.
In this perspective, attention and conscious perception are dis-
tinct but naturally connected in a way that allows for what appears
to be reasonable and fruitful interpretations of some key empir-
ical studies of them and their relationship. Crudely, perception
and attention stand to each other as accuracy and precision, sta-
tistically speaking, stand to each other. We have seen that this
gives rise to reasonably coherent interpretations of speciﬁc types
of experimental paradigms. Further mathematical modeling and
empirical evidence is needed to fully bring out this conjecture,
and a number of the interpretations were shown to lead to testable
predictions.
To end, I brieﬂy suggest this unifying approach also sits rea-
sonably well with some very general approaches to attention and
perception.
From a commonsense perspective, endogenous and exogenous
attention have different functional roles. Endogenous attention
can only be directed at contents that are already conscious (how
can I direct attention to something I am not conscious of?)
and when states of affairs grab exogenous attention they thereby
become conscious (if I fail to become aware of something then
how could my attention have been grabbed?). This is an oversim-
pliﬁcation, as can be seen from the studies reviewed above. The
mapping of conscious perception and attention onto the elements
of predictive coding can explain the commonsense understand-
ing of their relationship but also why it breaks down. Normally
endogenous attention is directed at things we already perceive so
that no change is missed, i.e., more precision is expected and the
gain is turned up. But precision gain itself is neutral on the actual
state of affairs, it just makes the system more sensitive to predic-
tion error, so if we direct attention at a location that seems empty
but that has a subthreshold stimulus we are still more likely to spot
it in the end. Conversely, even if precision expectations are driven
up by an increase in signal strength somewhere, and attention in
this sense is grabbed, it does not follow that this signal must drive
conscious perception. A competing model may as a matter of fact
have higher probability.
It is sometimes said that a good way to conceive of conscious
perception and attention is in terms of the former as a synthe-
sizer that allows us to make sense of our otherwise chaotic sensory
input, and the latter as an analyzer that allows us to descend from
the overall synthesized picture and focus on a few more salient
things (Van Boxtel et al., 2010). The predictive coding account
allows this sentiment: prediction error minimization is indeed a
way of solving the inverse problem of ﬁguring out what in the
world caused the sensory input, and attention does allow us to
weight the least uncertain parts of this signal. The key insight
from this perspective is however that though these are distinct
neural processes they are both needed to allow the brain to solve
its inverse problem. But when there are competing models, they
can work against each other, and conscious perception can shift
between models as precisions and bounds are optimized and the
world selectively sampled.
Perhaps the most famous thing said about attention is from
James:
Everyone knows what attention is. It is the taking posses-
sion by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of
what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains of
thought. Focalization, concentration, of consciousness are of
its essence. It implieswithdrawal from some things in order to
deal effectively with others, and is a conditionwhich has a real
opposite in the confused, dazed, scatter-brained state which
in French is called distraction, and Zerstreutheit in German
(James, 1890, Vol. I, pp. 403–404).
The current proposal is that “attention is simply the process of
optimizing precision during hierarchical inference”(Friston, 2009,
p. 7). This does not mean the predictive coding account of atten-
tion stands in direct opposition to the Jamesian description. It is a
more accurate, reductive and unifying account of the mechanism
underlying parts of the phenomenon James is trying to capture:
James’ description captures many of the aspects of endogenous
attention and model competition that are discussed in terms of
precision in this paper.
The sentiment that attention is intimately connected with per-
ception in a hypothesis testing framework was captured very early
on by Helmholtz. He argued, for example, that binocular rivalry
is an attentional effect but he explicated attention in terms of
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activity, novelty, and surprise, which is highly reminiscent of the
contemporary predictive coding framework:
The natural unforced state of our attention is to wander
around to ever new things, so that when the interest of an
object is exhausted, when we cannot perceive anything new,
then attention against our will goes to something else. [. . .] If
wewant attention to stick to an object we have to keep ﬁnding
something new in it, especially if other strong sensations seek
to decouple it (Helmholtz, 1860, p. 770; translated by JH).
Helmholtz does not here mention precision expectations but
they ﬁnd a natural place in his description of attention’s role
in determining conscious content: precision expectations enable
attention to stick, where sticking helps, and to wander more
fruitfully too.
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